TOWARDS A CRITICAL POIESIS: CLIMATE JUSTICE AND DISPLACEMENT

Pearl Kan* 

[A]n imaginative making—Poiesis

—Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

I. PROLOGUE: START FROM WHEREVER YOU ARE .................................... 24
II. NATIVE VILLAGE OF KIVALINA V. EXXONMOBIL CORP. .................... 26
   A. Before the Lawsuit ........................................................................... 26
   B. Federal Court Cannot Redress Kivalina’s Harms ....................... 27
   C. Displacement of Federal Common Law ....................................... 28
      1. Doctrine of Displacement .......................................................... 29
      2. Applying the Doctrine of Displacement to Other Environmental Laws ........................................ 29
      3. Difference in Remedy Requested Does Not Change Ninth Circuit’s Displacement Analysis .................................. 30
      4. Ninth Circuit Concludes CAA is Comprehensive Enough to Displace Kivalina’s Claims ............................... 32
III. NEW DEPARTURES IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CLIMATE JUSTICE .......................................................... 34
IV. BRIEF HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ....................................... 35
   A. Environmental Justice Encompasses Many Different Social Justice Movements .................................................... 36
   B. Capitalism and Its Economic Logic .............................................. 37
   C. Environmental Justice’s Staying Power: Saying No and the Force of Storytelling .................................................. 38
V. UNSTABLE STUFF: POIESIS, TECHNE AND THE LAW ....................... 41
   A. A Brief Introduction to Poiesis ......................................................... 42
   B. The Continuing Task of Environmental Justice Lawyering ................................................................. 43

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1 GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, DEATH OF A DISCIPLINE 37 (2003).
How do we talk about the Arctic? . . . .

We talk about big animals, big migrations, big hunting, big land, big rivers, big ocean, and big sky; and also about big coal, big oil, big warming, big spills, big pollution, big legislations, and big lawsuits.

And we talk about small things, too—small animals, small migrations, small hunting, small rivers, small warming, small spills, small pollution, small legislations, and small lawsuits.

—Subhankar Banerjee

We are now over fourteen years into the twenty-first century. I am not trained as a scientist. I stumbled into environmental law with little capacity for acronyms and even less capacity for numbers. My only means to access an issue, even a legal issue, is through literary experience. We tell ourselves stories in order to live. A brute within the law, I can only start where I am and hope to tell a story. Climate change is a large idea. Carbon markets are a large idea. The market itself is an amorphous and opaque idea. I will shelve these large ideas for now. Start small, start with the tactile, start with an image even, and respond.

Imagine somewhere up North. North of the Arctic Circle, there is an 8-mile-long barrier reef island. There, lies a village of about four

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2 Subhankar Banerjee, *From Kolkata to Kaktovik En Route to Arctic Voices*, in *Arctic Voices: Resistance at the Tipping Point* 1–2 (Subhankar Banerjee ed., 2012).
hundred people. Their tiny village is named Kivalina. The people trace their ancestry back thousands of years to one of the very first settlements in the Americas. The village consists of mostly Iñupiat, natives of northern Alaska. Like many Alaska natives, the villagers of Kivalina survive the harsh Arctic climate through a close understanding of the hunting and gathering seasons, retaining a largely subsistence-based way of life.

Imagine an aerial photograph taken of this village, the coastline inches closer and closer to the houses, the school, the hospital. The coastline is eroded. The village looks dangerously close to being submerged by the sea. Soon it will happen. There is another photograph, this one a close-up of a young girl, about nine or ten, with long dark hair and a wide toothy grin, smiling straight into the camera. *Things that exist exist and everything is on their side.* You now know that this is not entirely true, that you are talking about the law, not art, and what exists in art may have no place in the law. The first image sticks in your mind as an example of an enterprise gone awry, the culmination of the effects of anthropogenic climate change embodied in one single photograph. The second image, the one of the girl, is more harrowing: it speaks to you as an image of a lost future. These two images alone are enough for you to conclude that something is wrong, irrevocably wrong.

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5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.


10 ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: FLOODING, supra note 9, at 32; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-551, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION 1 (2009) [hereinafter ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS].


13 See generally JONATHAN LEAR, RADICAL HOPE: ETHICS IN AN AGE OF CULTURAL DEVASTATION (2006).
II. NATIVE VILLAGE OF KIVALINA V. EXXONMOBIL CORP.

A. Before the Lawsuit

Ten years ago the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report entitled “Alaska Native Villages: Most Are Affected by Flooding and Erosion, but Few Qualify for Federal Assistance.” Ten years later the Ninth Circuit says basically the same thing: you are harmed but we can do nothing about it. In 2009, GAO issued another report, “Alaska Native Villages: Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion.” The report discusses how the lack of a lead federal agency tasked with addressing questions of relocation pertaining to Native Alaskan villages makes it difficult to coordinate concerted action. But there is more to this story. Christine Shearer has written a book that tracks how climate change and the lack of regulatory responses have affected Kivalina over decades. As early as 1992, noting increased erosion of the island, the community voted to relocate. Kivalina had selected a new site by 1998. “As they tried to engineer the move, however, they found that a government body to assist communities with relocation does not exist.” The City Administrator, Janet Mitchell, reported: “[w]e talked to everyone we could. But the word relocation does not exist at the federal level, and I doubt it exists at the state level.” Colleen Swan “reported a similar experience: ‘There wasn’t anyone we could talk to about global warming. . . . There’s no agency in the federal government that deals with climate change.’” Colleen Swan reported: “[d]ue to the lack of ice formation along the shores of Kivalina, by October 2004 the land began failing . . . . The island seemed to be falling apart and disappearing into the Chukchi Sea before the very eyes of its inhabitants.”

14 See ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: FLOODING, supra note 9, at 32.
15 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
16 See ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED PROGRESS, supra note 10, at 20 (“Federal programs to assist threatened villages prepare for and recover from disasters and to protect and relocate them are limited and unavailable to some villages.”).
17 Id.
18 See SHEARER, supra note 4, at 207–08.
19 Id. at 208.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 210.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 208.
Nine years ago the island was falling apart. Nine years later there is still no federal solution to the problem. How can you insist that your problem is real, that you face imminent danger, if there is no agency, in fact—no language at all—within the regulatory regime to receive your narrative? If you don’t speak my language, how can you understand what I am trying to tell you? The word relocation does not exist at the federal level. The problem presented is doubly disturbing: first, because the federal government is not fully prepared to address these imminent dangers, and second, because we now have to contend with the reality that the question of relocation is real and must be addressed as a matter of national policy.

B. Federal Court Cannot Redress Kivalina’s Harms

The district court in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and lack of standing. In considering “whether [courts] have legal tools to reach a ruling that is ‘principled, rational, and based upon reasoned distinctions’” the district court emphasized that “the relevant inquiry is whether the judiciary is granting relief in a reasoned fashion versus allowing the claims to proceed such that they ‘merely provide hope without a substantive legal basis for a ruling.’” The district court found that the central difficulty is locating a “discrete number of ‘polluters’” and “by pressing this lawsuit, Plaintiffs are in effect asking this Court to make a political judgment that the two dozen Defendants named in this action should be the only ones to bear the cost of contributing to global warming.” While the district court acknowledges that even if the plaintiffs’ assertion that the named defendants are responsible for more of the problem than anyone else in the nation due to their collective greenhouse gas emissions is true, the court finds “that the allocation of fault—and cost—of global warming is a matter appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative branch in the first

25 Id. at 210.
26 See ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: FLOODING, supra note 9, at 19–26.
29 Id. at 874.
30 Id. at 874 (internal citations omitted).
31 Id. at 875.
32 Id. at 877.
instance.” On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit did not develop the political question or standing issues, but rather focused on the doctrine of displacement.

C. Displacement of Federal Common Law

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. is nicely bookended. It starts off clear as a cloudless day: “The question before us is whether the Clean Air Act, and the Environmental Protection Agency action that the Act authorizes, displaces Kivalina’s claims. We hold that it does.” Locating a poignant homonymic moment in the law, at the end of the opinion the majority writes “[o]ur conclusion obviously does not aid Kivalina, which itself is being displaced by the rising sea . . . . AFFIRMED.” The legal issue that the Ninth Circuit addressed in Kivalina is the narrow question of whether the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) and Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) authorized actions under the CAA displace a federal common law claim of public nuisance seeking damages as remedy.

While Kivalina was being appealed to the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court decided Connecticut v. American Electric Power (AEP). In AEP, New York City, eight states, and three private land trusts brought a public nuisance action against “the five largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States.” The plaintiffs in AEP brought their claim under a theory of federal common law interstate nuisance and sought injunctive relief through a court-ordered imposition of emissions caps. The Supreme Court in AEP held that “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of carbon dioxide emissions.” Under the holding of AEP the Supreme Court concluded that the CAA “thus provides a means to seek limits on emissions of carbon dioxide from domestic power plants—the same relief the plaintiffs seek by invoking federal common law.” The Court reasons that, because under the CAA the EPA has the power to regulate pollution abatement specifically, the plaintiffs’ cause of action is squarely displaced by the regulatory scheme of the CAA.

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33 Id. at 877.
34 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
35 Id. at 858.
36 Id. at 856–57.
38 Id. at 2534.
39 Id. at 2537.
40 Id. at 2538.
1. Doctrine of Displacement

The doctrine of displacement is especially relevant to environmental laws. In *Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II)*,\(^41\) the Supreme Court held that the amendments to the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) displaced the nuisance claim that was originally recognized in *Illinois v. Milwaukee (Milwaukee I)*.\(^42\) The Supreme Court explained that “when Congress addresses a question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law . . . the need for such an unusual exercise of law-making by federal court disappears.”\(^43\) The test for whether a specific federal law displaces federal common law or not turns on whether the statute “speak[s] directly to [the] question” at issue.\(^44\) The Ninth Circuit in *Kivalina* also relies on the doctrine of displacement to dismiss Kivalina’s case from federal court.

2. Applying the Doctrine of Displacement to Other Environmental Laws

The Ninth Circuit in *Kivalina* cites case law concerning nuisance causes of action and displacement analysis within the context of the CWA for the proposition that where a cause of action is displaced, the damage remedy is displaced as well.\(^45\) In the CWA case, *Middlesex v. National Sea Clammers Association*, the public nuisance claim sought both injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, for harm done to fishing grounds caused by ocean dumping and discharges of sewage.\(^46\) The Supreme Court in *Middlesex* emphasized that after *Illinois v. Milwaukee*, “[t]he Court has now held that the federal common law of nuisance in the area of water pollution is entirely pre-empted by the more comprehensive scope of the [Federal Water Pollution Control Act (“FWPCA”)], which was completely revised soon after the decision in *Illinois v Milwaukee*.”\(^47\) While the Court in *Middlesex* does not utilize the test of whether the statute, the FWCPA, “speaks directly to the question” presented by the plaintiffs, the Court concludes that it does not have to reach that question because

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\(^44\) *Id.* (internal citations omitted).
\(^47\) *Id.* at 22.
the statute is comprehensive enough that it preempts all federal common law claims concerning water pollution.\textsuperscript{48}

It should be noted that critical to the Court’s analysis of the comprehensiveness of the FWCPA (the precursor to the CWA as it exists today) was the fact that Congress revised the FWCPA after the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Milwaukee I}, which did recognize a nuisance claim. For the Supreme Court, the Congressional revision of the FWCPA in response to the Court’s decision in \textit{Milwaukee I} spoke to Congress’ intent to occupy the entire regulatory field regarding water pollution through its revision of the FWCPA.\textsuperscript{49} Here, with regard to the CAA, we have no analogous comprehensive statutory revision.

3. Difference in Remedy Requested Does Not Change Ninth Circuit’s Displacement Analysis

While the Ninth Circuit conceded that the application of the displacement test (whether the statute speaks directly to the question at issue) “can prove complicated,”\textsuperscript{50} the court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{AEP} to provide the necessary guidance.\textsuperscript{51} The Ninth Circuit notes that while Kivalina “does not seek abatement of emission” as the plaintiffs did in \textit{AEP} but rather “damages for harm caused by past emissions,” it nonetheless regards \textit{AEP} as instructive for the displacement analysis.\textsuperscript{52}

While \textit{Kivalina} and \textit{AEP} both utilized the theory of federal common law nuisance for their climate change litigation, the critical distinction between the two cases is the remedy requested. The plaintiffs in \textit{Kivalina} seek damages, not injunctive relief. In holding that there is no distinction between a federal common law claim of public nuisance that requests injunctive relief as opposed to damages, the Ninth Circuit majority opinion cites to the 2008 Supreme Court decision \textit{Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker} for the proposition that “under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a cause of action is displaced, displacement is extended to all remedies.”\textsuperscript{53}

The Ninth Circuit majority opinion quotes the language of \textit{Exxon Shipping} where the Supreme Court “rejected similar attempts to sever

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856.
  \item \textsuperscript{51} Id. at 856.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Id. at 857.
  \item \textsuperscript{53} Id.
\end{itemize}
remedies from their causes of action." However, the Exxon Shipping case is an uneasy analogy. The question left after AEP is whether a federal common law nuisance claim requesting damages differs from a federal common law nuisance claim requesting injunctive relief. In Exxon Shipping, defendant Exxon, faced with a jury verdict awarding punitive damages due to a 1989 grounding of an oil supertanker in Alaska, attempted to argue that the CWA displaced punitive damages but not compensatory damages.55 The Supreme Court, in response to Exxon’s argument explained, “nothing in the statutory text [of the CWA] points to fragmenting the recovery scheme this way, and we have rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action.”56 In fact, the Supreme Court goes on to say “[a]ll in all, we see no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies . . . . nor for that matter do we perceive that punitive damages for private harms will have any frustrating effect on the CWA remedial scheme.”57

The Supreme Court specifically distinguishes Exxon Shipping from cases such as Milwaukee on the grounds that, in Milwaukee, the “plaintiffs’ common law nuisance claims amounted to arguments for effluent-discharge standards different from those provided by the CWA. In Exxon Shipping, Baker’s private claims for economic injury do not threaten similar interference with federal regulatory goals with respect to ‘water,’ ‘shorelines,’ or ‘natural resources.’”58 The Exxon Shipping opinion actually strengthens the argument that there is a difference between a private claim for economic injury, which does not frustrate the overall goals of the regulatory scheme of a specific environmental law, and a common law claim seeking pollution standards, a remedy that is provided for in the CWA regulatory regime. A fortiori, because the plaintiffs in Kivalina are also requesting damages for economic injury, which does not frustrate the overall goals of the CAA (abatement of air pollution), there is a strong argument that Kivalina in fact differs from AEP in a dispositive way.

The concurring opinion in Kivalina employs a more nuanced reading of the Exxon Shipping case:

The Exxon Court was not evaluating whether a claim for damages is of a different character than a claim for injunctive

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54 Id. (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 489 (2008)).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 489 n.7.
relief. In fact, the case upon which Exxon relied for that statement, Silkwood, likewise disapproved of an attempt to sever compensatory and punitive damages, but its overall holding suggests that severing rights and remedies is appropriate as between damages and injunctive relief in some circumstances.59

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation concerned a preemption question in the context of the Atomic Energy Act.60 While the analysis for whether federal law preempts state law differs somewhat from the analysis of statutory displacement of common law, Silkwood is nonetheless a useful case for examining how rights and remedies relate to one another in a cause of action. Prior to Silkwood, the Supreme Court, in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission, concluded that states are preempted from regulating the safety aspects of nuclear energy.61 Despite the holding in Pacific Gas & Electric, the majority in Silkwood held that a state-authorized award of punitive damages arising out of the escape of plutonium from a federally-licensed nuclear facility is not preempted by federal law.62 In the Silkwood case, the Court seemed to focus on the purpose of the damages, and concluded that punitive damages did not frustrate the scheme of the Atomic Energy Act.63 While Silkwood addressed federal preemption of state law claims and Kivalina is focused on displacement of federal common law, the holding in Silkwood is still useful for understanding how broadly or how narrowly a court can choose to construct its preemption or displacement analysis when considering whether remedies can affect the scope of displacement or preemption.

4. Ninth Circuit Concludes CAA is Comprehensive Enough to Displace Kivalina’s Claims

Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit in Kivalina yokes the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Middlesex with the holding in AEP to conclude that the CAA is comprehensive enough to speak to any federal common law claim of nuisance, regardless of whether the claim seeks injunctive relief or damages. But in Kivalina, the request for damages resulting

59 Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 863 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013).
62 Id. at 258.
63 Id. at 257.
from greenhouse gas emissions is precisely what distinguishes the case from AEP. Any new rules promulgated by the EPA to limit greenhouse gas emissions would not “speak directly to the question at issue.” Indeed it could not speak directly to the question at issue because the statutory scheme of the CAA does not address the question of relocation.

No federal agency is currently tasked with addressing questions regarding the relocation of communities due to climate change, “and no funding is specifically designated for relocation.” 64 Furthermore, the CAA primarily addresses issues of air pollution. 65 So how does the statute in question, the CAA, and the EPA’s delegated authority to carry out the Act, speak directly to the question at issue? It depends entirely on how you present your question, doesn’t it? If the question is, ‘does the CAA address population displacement attributed to climate change?’ then it seems difficult to interpret the CAA as being comprehensive enough to speak directly to the question of climate change induced displacement. Furthermore, because of cases like Exxon Shipping and Silkwood, it seems there is still room to argue that here, because Kivalina’s request for damages does not frustrate the overall scheme of the CAA, the cause of action should be allowed to go forward.

The Native Village of Kivalina filed its petition for certiorari in February of 2013. 66 The Supreme Court denied the Native Village of

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Kivalina’s petition for certiorari on May 20, 2013. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in AEP, coupled with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kivalina, it is unclear whether there is a remaining path for federal common law claims to proceed in the CAA climate change tort context. Maybe we have to hit the bottom, exhaust all our options in order to revitalize and grow anew. Native Village of Kivalina is critical litigation that brings into focus the emerging principle of climate justice, and climate justice adds a new dimension to the growing body of environmental justice and environmental poverty lawyering issues in the twenty-first century.

III. NEW DEPARTURES IN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CLIMATE JUSTICE

This article takes off from Jonathan London and Julie Sze’s description of the environmental justice movement as praxis. London and Sze note that the environmental justice movement “draws from and integrates theory and practice in a mutually informing dialogue.” They go on to describe environmental justice as a movement that “rise[s] through the convergence of social movements, public policy, and scholarship.” Discussing the environmental justice movement as praxis in the twenty-first century provides the movement with the necessary elasticity to expand and encompass different populations, problems, and places. From a legal perspective, environmental justice as praxis enables the embrace of other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, and public health to complicate and broaden legalistic formulations of harm and redress. Climate justice is an emerging principle that subscribes to the larger environmental justice mission, though it presents new issues in light of the urgency of climate change.

This article started off with a discussion of the Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. litigation and will continue to utilize Kivalina to guide discussion of emerging issues within climate justice. Part III provides a brief overview of some of the key concerns of the

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68 “Only if one acknowledges that there is no longer a genuine way of going on like that might there arise new genuine ways of going on like that.” LEAR, supra note 13, at 51 (emphasis in original) (discussing the last great Chief of the Crow Nation and possibilities for hope after the end of a particular way of life).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
environmental justice movement, and an introduction to the inseparable relationship between capitalism and unequal distribution of environmental hazards. Part IV explores the perpetual task of the environmental poverty lawyer—which this paper terms critical *poiesis*, the task of simultaneously revealing into being the poetics of the vulnerable and the forgotten, as well as utilizing the technology of law, law’s *techne*, to create change. Part V advocates for what Arundhati Roy describes as “the Century of the Small,” ⁷³ and what Andrew Revkin terms as “the lesser Anthropocene.” ⁷⁴ The paper considers what change can look like in this increasingly interconnected world, and tentatively concludes that small acts must work in tandem and with the longer arc of history in mind. The article concludes with a discussion of mankind’s entry into a new geologic age, and underscores how this moment of temporal and geologic convergence presents new opportunities and challenges for the law. The article also ends on an aspirational note. The environmental justice lawyer in the twenty-first century must continue to master many languages, starting with the language of the law, but without forsaking the language of the people. Only by telling this world, by insisting upon the thing seen, can we shape this world.

**IV. BRIEF HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE**

The environmental justice movement today is still, at its core, an insistence that we do in fact exist. The environmental justice movement originally developed to address “the lack of adequate attention to race and class issues by [the] mainstream environmental movement.” ⁷⁵ David Pellow puts it another way: “This is what the movement for environmental justice has stood for since its inception: the inextricable relationship between the degradation of people and their ecosystems.” ⁷⁶ Pellow goes on to suggest that “[w]hen movements can articulate these links and integrate them into international norms and state and corporate policies and practices, this constitutes a remarkable achievement, because it involves both discursive and structural ‘disruptions’ in the otherwise normal flow of power.” ⁷⁷ The discursive and disruptive force of the environmental justice movement ultimately makes visible

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⁷³ See *Roy*, supra note 27, at 5.
⁷⁵ *Sze & London*, supra note 69, at 1334.
⁷⁷ *Id.*
communities and peoples that the late modern machine discounts as disposable.

A. Environmental Justice Encompasses Many Different Social Justice Movements

There are many points of entry to the environmental justice movement itself and by now there are a growing number of books and articles that explore this history well. In Luke Cole and Sheila Foster’s seminal work, *From the Ground Up: Environmental Racism and the Rise of the Environmental Justice Movement*, the authors liken the environmental justice movement to a river, “fed over time by many tributaries.” From the Civil Rights Movement to the Anti-Toxic’s Movement to the Labor Movement, environmental justice carries a “perspective that recognize[s] that the disproportionate impact of environmental hazards [is] not random or the result of ‘neutral’ decisions but a product of the same social and economic structure which had produced *de jure* and *de facto* segregation and other racial oppression.” Environmental justice recognizes that environmental hazards, externalities largely associated with the frenetic productivity of our capitalist system, are calculated to burden the most vulnerable and the poor because there corporate power faces the least resistance—or so they think. The historic struggle over the siting of waste facilities embodies many of the issues the environmental justice movement has identified throughout the years. It “concerns itself with the cleanup of contaminated industrial sites, the elimination of occupational hazards, lead abatement, enforcement of existing environmental regulations, and the guarantee of representation in the environmental decision-making process.” Environmental justice can be understood as both aiming to tackle the immediate problem at hand—whether the issue concerns access to safe drinking water or cleanup of contaminated industrial

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79 COLE & FOSTER, supra note 78, at 20.

80 Id. at 21.

81 See The Warriors of Qiugang, YALE ENV’T 360 (Jan. 10, 2011), http://e360.yale.edu/feature /the_warriors_of_qiugang_a_chinese_village_fights_back/2358/ (a documentary about a small village in China’s successful organizing and fight against a chemical company in their village).

82 COLE & FOSTER, supra note 78, at 17.
sites—without losing sight of the larger systemic problems, such as the overuse of nitrogen fertilizer in industrial agriculture or a regulatory regime’s historical inattention to the economic and racial disparities associated with hazardous waste siting decisions.

**B. Capitalism and Its Economic Logic**

In Rob Nixon’s *Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor*, one of the book’s first epilogues comes from a leaked confidential memo written by Lawrence Summers, the former president of the World Bank. Summers writes: “I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that . . . .” The “economic logic” and the calculations that track the treadmill of production and disposal make sense within the hermeneutics of market-based capitalism. “The production of social inequalities by race, class, gender, and nation is not an aberration or the result of market failures. Rather, it is evidence of the normal, routine, functioning of capitalist economies. Modern market economies are supposed to produce social inequalities and environmental inequalities.” Nixon analyzes Summers’ rationalization of his “poison-redistribution ethic as offering a double gain, it would benefit the United States and Europe economically, while helping appease the rising discontent of rich-nation environmentalists.” The logic of the double gain overshadows the double loss: lowest wage countries not only

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84 AB 1329, the Toxics Equity Act, which was signed into law by Governor Brown on October 5, 2013 would require California’s Department of Toxic Substances Control to prioritize an enforcement action for a community identified by the California Environmental Protection Agency as most impacted by environmental justice. 2013 Cal. Stat. 4735. For text of statute see AB 1329 Hazardous Waste, CAL. LEGISLATIVE INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201320140AB1329 (last visited Jan. 23, 2015).


86 The treadmill of production posits that the system of perpetual growth and profit associated with capitalism necessitates an endless consumption of natural resources—a model that could never lead to environmental sustainability. See generally KENNETH A. GOULD, DAVID N. PELLOW & ALLAN SCHNAIBERG, THE TREADMILL OF PRODUCTION: INJUSTICE AND UNSUSTAINABILITY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2008).

87 PELLOW, supra note 76, at 17.

88 NIXON, supra note 78, at 2.
receive the toxic waste of the wealthy nations, but their lack of participatory power continually leaves them no choice but to receive.89

While Nixon and Pellow discuss capitalism’s economic logic with regard to waste and toxics, these ideas may be extended to climate justice as well. As ExxonMobil and other large oil and gas companies continue to increase their profits by engaging in the business of greenhouse gas emissions, within this schema communities like the Native Village of Kivalina are, at the end of the day, expendable, unaccounted for externalities that make perfect economic sense within the bounds of free market logic: four hundred people in the middle of the Chukchi Sea pale in comparison to the $44.9 billion earned in 2012 by one company alone.90

C. Environmental Justice’s Staying Power: Saying No and the Force of Storytelling

[A]n experimental art whose touchstone is again an emergence, giving a very concrete meaning to Gilles Deleuze’s motto that to think is to resist.
—Isabelle Stengers91

By now, the corpus of environmental justice literature reflects a movement—at times disparate, at times synchronized—that stands to resist the worldview that the market is the choice determinant of free will,92 that the end of history rests with one word: globalization.93 I have finally started to understand what resistance means. Sometimes the only meaningful utterance is ‘no.’ But there is more. One must say no with

89 PELLOW, supra note 76, at 191.
90 ExxonMobil earned $44.9 billion overall in 2012, just $300 million short of the world record. See Chris Isidore, Exxon Mobil Profit is Just Short of Record, CNN MONEY (Feb. 1, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/02/01/news/companies/exxon-mobil-profit/index.html?id=HP_LN.
92 “Neoliberals have a wide variety of views on political and social matters, ranging from the highly conservative standpoint of Friedrich Hayek to the more rigorously libertarian position of Milton Friedman; but they are one in seeing the free market as the fountainhead of human freedom.” John Gray, The World is Round, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 11, 2005 at 1–2.
93 “That meant that nothing was left to stand in the way of a truly global free market, one in which liberated corporations were not only free in their own countries but free to travel across borders unhindered, unleashing prosperity around the world . . . . It was, as Francis Fukuyama said, ‘the end of history’—‘the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution.’” NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE 22 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
one breath, but continue to forge ahead in the next. For every master
narrative there exist a hundred counter-narratives.\footnote{94}

Why does environmental justice make people uncomfortable? To say
no to the status quo is inherently destabilizing. To say no is to refuse.
But there is something more uncomfortable here than the autonomous
decision to say no. The pithy statement ‘no,’ declared \textit{in public}, is both
a statement and a stance. This singular word—‘no’—has the power to
implicate formidable institutions and disrupt well-established systems of
thought. This small word has surprising, seismic force.\footnote{95} Environmental
justice doubts that, as a nation-state, we understand what equal
treatment means.\footnote{96} The movement is skeptical of the proposition that
efficiency and cost-benefit analyses are neutral, and it insists that even
neutrality itself can impose or affirm a worldview that perpetuates
disparities.\footnote{97}

\footnote{94} For examples of how legal scholars can inflect the dominant historical narrative in law with
critical perspectives see, e.g., Robert S. Chang, \textit{Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship:
and Richard Delgado, \textit{Rodrigo’s Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and U.S. Civil Rights}, 60

\footnote{95} In addition to saying no, we should honestly acknowledge that we cannot always expect a
specific event, an action item, to follow from saying “no” affirmatively. Philosopher Isabelle
Stengers writes: “[a]dding a cosmopolitical dimension to the problems that we consider from a
political angle does not lead to answers everyone should finally accept. It raises the question of
the way in which the cry of fright or the murmur of the idiot can be heard ‘collectively,’ in the
assemble created around a political issue . . . . Giving this insistence a name, cosmos, inventing
the way in which ‘politics,’ our signature, could proceed, construct its legitimate reasons ‘in the
presence of’ that which remains deaf to this legitimacy: that is the cosmopolitical proposal.”
\textit{Stengers, supra} note 91, at 996.

\footnote{96} While the U.S. EPA defines environmental justice as “the fair treatment and meaningful
involvement of all people regardless of race, color, national origin or income with respect to the
development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies,”
this focus on fair treatment \textit{regardless} of race, fails to take into account the racial dimensions of
vironmentaljustice/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2015). Compare EPA’s definition of environmental
justice with the principles of environmental justice adopted during the First National People of
Color Environmental Leadership Summit in 1991, which recognizes that discriminatory practices
abound and the only way to address issues of environmental justice is by acknowledging our
differences, including race: “We, the people of color, gathered together at this multinational
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit, to begin to build a national and international
movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking of our lands . . . to respect
and celebrate each of our cultures . . . .” \textit{FIRST NAT’L PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVTL. LEADERSHIP
SUMMIT, PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE} (1991), \textit{available at} http://www.ejnet.org/ej/
principles.html.

\footnote{97} \textit{See ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: FLOODING, supra} note 9, at 3. The Continuing Authorities
Program, administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Watershed Protection and
Flood Prevention Program, administered by the Department of Agriculture’s Natural Resources
Conservation Service, are the principal federal programs that provide assistance for the
prevention or control of flooding and erosion. “However, small and remote Alaska Native
Ann Lauterbach’s remark that “[c]hoice confined to the marketplace endangers the very core of participatory democratic processes.”

Environmental justice refuses the lie that to choose between one’s health and access to employment is a meaningful choice. It moves along the discursive meridian to embrace storytelling and to write against the grain of the market based machinery.

Environmental justice is also personal. It is in large part an outcry against a world of toxics that disproportionately burdens the bodies of the poor, of people of color. It is a complex thing to talk about the body, the diseased physical body poisoned by toxics that, under the legal gaze, cannot be traced to one single wrongdoer or even multiple wrongdoers. The literary corpus is also a body. It is a body of words that inscribes and is inscribed upon, some palimpsest of stories that insists, resists, and remains. The literary corpus of environmental justice is a body of words that gives voice to the body that aches. Law too belongs in the realm of the literary, that institution which has no

villages often fail to qualify for assistance under these programs” because they do not meet program criteria. Id. For example, according to the Corps’ guidelines for evaluating water resource projects, the Corps generally cannot undertake a project when the economic costs exceed the expected benefits. Id. With few exceptions, Alaska Native villages’ requests for assistance under this program are denied because the project costs usually outweigh expected benefits. Id. “Even villages that meet the Corps’ cost/benefit criteria may still not receive assistance if they cannot meet cost-share requirements for the project.” Id. Though the cost-benefit criteria are not clear, the report seems to say that saving the lives of four hundred people (just looking at Kivalina alone) from permanent displacement—which is the looming issue when we talk about coastal erosion and flooding—is not enough of an expected benefit for the federal government’s cost-benefit calculus.


The trend of modern standing jurisprudence makes it more and more difficult to “trace” your harm back to the alleged wrongdoer. See also Sze & London, supra note 69, at 1338, 1346. Consider how one might ever be able to meet the “fair traceability” requirement for modern Article III standing in the situation illustrated here:

[the] direct effects of pollution hit people and animals harder in the Arctic, too. Airborne pollutants emitted in the mid-regions of the planet swirl north...collect in organisms, and continue up the food chain. In an excerpt Banerjee includes from a book called Silent Snow: The Slow Poisoning of the Arctic, the environmental journalist Marla Cone writes, ‘The Inuit living in northern Greenland, near the North Pole, contain the highest concentrations of chemical contaminants found in humans anywhere on earth.’

bounds. What endures? No one dies so poor that he does not leave something behind.

V. UNSTABLE STUFF: POIESIS, TECHNE AND THE LAW

I began with a literary idea of experience, and I still don’t know where all the lies are.
—Joan Didion

The Greeks have the word aletheia for revealing. The Romans translate this with veritas. We say “truth” and usually understand it as correctness of representation.
—Heidegger

Poetic Justice
—Kendrick Lamar

The structure of law is replete with its own language, semiotics, and semantics. There are many functions of the law: to enforce rights, allow for redress, to punish. Here, in the context of climate justice, I focus on the functionality of the law that allows one to state a claim. In short, to be heard and to be seen, rendered visible, recognized. The language of law quite literally brings forth into being. It is so ordered.

I argue here that in the context of climate justice, using Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. as a continuing example, the law does not have to exercise its technocratic power over its power to reveal, to bring forth. Ultimately, the task of the law in a democratic society is to make present, to bring out of concealment. Kivalina and its corresponding tort claims present an aporia in the law that the displacement of federal common law claims, as a legal principle, does not sufficiently answer. It does not sufficiently reveal or bring forth veritas because it does not adequately represent the new types of questions presented by large-scale displacement of native Alaskans due to climate change.

103 Linda Kuehl, Joan Didion: The Art of Fiction LXXI, PARIS REV., Fall-Winter 1978, at 142, 162.
105 KENDRICK LAMAR, Poetic Justice, on GOOD KID, M.A.A.D. CITY (Top Dog Entertainment, Aftermath & Interscope Records 2012).
A. A Brief Introduction to Poiesis

In Plato’s formulation of poiesis, the term means coming forth, bringing forth,107 and Heidegger builds on this by explaining poiesis as the process of bringing forth something out of concealment. This unconcealment can also be understood as revealing.108 Unconcealment or revealing requires that something resides, and is present, but is hidden. In Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology, the conclusion of his essay reads like a hybrid of poem and parable:

There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name techne. Once the revealing that brings forth truth into the splendor of radiant appearance was also called techne.

Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was called techne. The poiesis of the fine arts was also called techne.

. . . . . And art was simply techne. It was a single, manifold revealing. It was pious, promos, i.e., yielding to the holding sway and safekeeping of truth.

. . . .

What was art—perhaps only for that brief but magnificent age? Why did art bear the modest name techne? Because it was a revealing the brought forth and made present, and therefore belonged within poiesis . . .109

I focus on this interaction between techne and poiesis—the technical craft and the poetical—because I see the magnetism between the two concepts as instructive for the law in the age of climate change. If, according to Heidegger, art—the beautiful—bears the modest name techne simply because it functions to reveal, and if art, too, belongs within the realm of poiesis because poiesis too carries with it the function of revealing, then craftsmanship, the technical, and poiesis both have the same task: to reveal, to bring forth into being. Whichever path you choose, the technical or the poetical, the task is still the same: to reveal, to bring forth and make present. The continuing task of the

107 Heidegger, supra note 104, at 311.
108 Id. at 302.
109 Id. at 315–16.
environmental poverty lawyer, too, is to bring forth and make present both the beautiful, the poetics of lived experience, and the crafted, structured technology of law.

B. The Continuing Task of Environmental Justice Lawyering

The lawyer is trained to scrutinize the details, the minutiae of statutory codes and registers. This can be a strength, the techne of the law. But the environmental justice advocate is still tasked with that equally critical responsibility of revealing into being, striving toward the correctness of representation. This is the role of poiesis. Displacement is a convenient legal principle to rely on in order to preclude federal common law claims from proceeding within climate change tort actions. The doctrine of displacement may be enough to stave off litigation for now but, perhaps more urgently, the problem of displacement is here to stay. Whichever legal doctrine you employ to keep these cases out of the courts, you cannot suppress the problem for the long haul. The problem of large-scale displacement due to climate change and global warming has arrived. It has arrived and it will continue to arrive. It is and will continue to be an emerging, persisting and irrevocable reality. Give a thing a name and find the law to let the narrative develop, or give a thing a name and find the law to squash it. Poetically, the law and the problem before us both have one and the same name: displacement.

C. Techne and Technology: Globalization and the Invisible Local

The philosophy of technology according to Heidegger brings the function of techne toward the modest task of revealing “truth” in the present moment. In stark contrast to this understanding of techne as being a vehicle for truth-revealing, technology also plays an acute role as the driving force of globalization in the late modern era.110 With the advent of accelerated processes of communication, technology has in part allowed the wealthy to continue to amass more wealth and for those in power to carefully guard access points to information.111 Even beyond the capacity for technology in our time to create vast disparities between the wealthy and the poor, in its most insipid form technology

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110 See Gray, supra note 92, at 2.
111 See Sherry Cable, Thomas E. Shriver & Tamara L. Mix, Risk Society and Contested Illness: The Case of Nuclear Weapons Workers, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 380, 393 (June 2008) (noting that the Oak Ridge Nuclear Reservation workers’ illness claims “were contested by corporate management authorities who used three tactics: denial of individual exposures, refusal to allow access to health records, and reassignment to unfavorable job tasks”).
continually distracts us from bringing forth the type of clarity necessary to see an issue as it is.

In John Gray’s 2005 review of Thomas Friedman’s neoliberal embrace of globalization, Gray critiques the metaphor of Friedman’s “flat world” as uncritical and oversimplified. Gray concedes that while Friedman “acknowledges the existence of an ‘unflat’ world composed of people without access to the benefits of new technology,” nonetheless “[Friedman] never connects the growth of this netherworld of the relatively poor with the advance of globalization.” Gray dissects Friedman’s visit to Infosys headquarters, a high-tech company in Bangalore, as failing to recognize “the widening difference in standards of life in the region . . .” Gray underscores that it is “only by decoupling itself from the local environment that Infosys is able to compete effectively in global markets. Infosys demonstrates that globalization does have the effect of leveling some inequalities in world markets, but the success of the company has been achieved by using services and infrastructure that the society around it lacks.” Global processes and the technological advances that have helped make the “world smaller” and communication faster still do not automatically make this world a more equitable or just place. In fact, we are now living in a distinctively unequal world, plagued by persistent issues of poverty.

John Gray’s criticism of Friedman’s “The World is Flat” is a warning against the dangerous ease with which neoliberals embrace globalization as a unidirectional force that purports to level the playing field. Within the politics of twenty-first century natural resource exploitation, climate justice brings into sharp focus the largely unaccounted for externalities perpetuated by a global economy powered by energy-intensive, fossil fuel dependent lifestyles. In fact, climate justice emerges as a critical voice that exposes and insists upon the intimate relationship between global processes and local cultural

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112 Gray, supra note 92, at 4.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Some Are More Unequal Than Others, N.Y.TIMES CAMPAIGN STOPS BLOG (Oct. 26, 2012), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/stiglitz-some-are-more-unequal-than-others/ (stating that “[i]t’s not just that the top 1 percent takes in about a fifth of the income, and controls more than a third of the wealth. America also has become the country (among the advanced industrial countries) with the least equality of opportunity”).
118 Gray, supra note 92, at 2.
devastation, as much as the global market economy attempts to decouple the two.

If climate justice subscribes to the larger goals of environmental justice—bringing to light the disproportionate hazards and risks that beleaguer the poor and people of color—it follows that as an organizing principle, climate justice cannot do this properly without manifestly acknowledging the inequalities associated with the larger currents of globalization and industrialization. An emphasis on the longer arc of history and its corresponding lessons is imperative as we continue to craft local solutions with an eye toward larger systemic problems.

D. Resist Flattening

The Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. refracts these larger issues of globalization and energy-intensive modern lifestyles through the lens of litigation. The plaintiffs in Kivalina identify twenty-four of the largest emitters of greenhouse gases in the U.S. through their ownership and operation of electric power plants as defendants by reasoning, “[e]lectric power plants that burn fossil fuels are the largest source of carbon dioxide emissions in the United States. Such plants in the U.S. emit approximately 2.6 billion tons of carbon dioxide each year.”¹¹⁹ One of the challenges the plaintiffs faced in district court is the fair traceability requirement for standing. Defendants “argue that plaintiffs lack standing under Article III to pursue their global warming claims under a nuisance theory on the ground that their injury is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the conduct of the defendants.”¹²⁰ The district court ultimately favored the defendants’ position noting that “the Plaintiffs’ allegations as to the undifferentiated nature of greenhouse gas emissions from all global sources and their worldwide accumulation over long periods of time, the pleadings makes clear that there is no realistic possibility of tracing any particular alleged effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any specific person, entity, group at any particular point in time.”¹²¹

I wonder if this moment in climate change tort litigation also serves as an opportunity to locate and expose the narrative gap that parallels the lazy “flattening” metaphor that Gray warns against. The refrain that the environmental lawyer hears again and again from policymakers and

¹²¹ Id. at 880.
politicians is that everyone emits greenhouse gases—that we are all at fault. How can we trace our harm to the specific molecular emission of a particular polluter? The growing, difficult, but persistent task is to link large and seemingly global processes, such as global releases of greenhouse gases, to local effects and harms. The organizing principle of climate justice refuses the decoupling effect that globalization seeks to promote.

In the age of climate change, the discussion of techne and technology is necessarily twofold and divergent. It focuses on the contradictory ability of technology to obscure the deleterious effects of an ever growing global market and also the modest function of techne to make present, to authentically portray lived reality, and adequately depict those harmed by the currents of globalization. It is my small attempt here to try to reclaim the modest function of techne, despite the dominant consumerist view of technology as largely an endless catalog of acquireable and disposable goods in the global era, to try to revamp and restore techne’s original utility and ability to reveal the persistent systemic problems that come along with man’s dependency on a fossil fuel powered economy.

The environmental poverty lawyer must continue to utilize law’s techne to infuse the public sphere with narratives resisting the decoupling mechanism globalization imposes on local communities. The persistence and utilization of law’s techne to implement social change in the language of environmental justice will reverberate and grow louder through time if we continue to resist essentialism. The environmental poverty advocate, strengthened by our heritage in grassroots organizing and community lawyering, must continue to go forward with a sensitivity to detail, respect and attention for the small, recognizing that different struggles speak different vernaculars, and must resist the temptation to flatten stories along the tired binaries of good versus bad and victor versus victim.

E. Convergence and the Correctness of Representation

Correctness of representation, as Heidegger explains as veritas, is the inherent and core struggle for narrative dominance within our adversarial legal system. Because truth, veritas, and truthful representation are ever contested, it becomes clear that the role of the advocate, and the environmental justice advocate, is to present and maintain the correctness of representation for the longue durée. “Correctness,” of course, is always up for grabs, and it is often idiosyncratic to the facts presented. But here again lies the importance of poiesis. Bring forth into being. Tell the story as honestly as you can.
This is no simple task, but you find your compass if you are willing to see things as they are, within all their contradictions; willing to immerse in both sadness and beauty, which at times are inseparable.

If correctness of representation is at its core unstable, the judiciary should at least create the necessary space for adequate recognition of the problem associated with climate change-induced displacement. There should at least be a possibility for the conversation to move forward, fractured and acrimonious as it is. The law should provide the necessary dialogic space to acknowledge that there is a disharmony within the crisis of climate change, that not everyone is impacted equally, and that we all (legislative, executive, judiciary) need to play an adequate role in revealing into being both what the problem is as well as make possible a solution. The emerging principle of climate justice can help us locate this tension in the law—the dire need for action pulling against the tremendous difficulty of tangible solutions—by bringing forth and giving voice to those like the Kivalina villagers, who are among the most affected by climate change and yet have contributed little to global warming due to their traditional ways of life. The critical moment of our climate crisis is fraught with contradictions and injustices, yet it also presents new opportunities to imagine this melting world.

VI. CLIMATE CHANGE HAS ARRIVED

Who knows, perhaps that’s what the twenty-first century has in store for us. The dismantling of the Big. Big bombs, big dams, big ideologies, big contradictions, big countries, big wars, big heroes, big mistakes. Perhaps it will be the Century of the Small. Perhaps right now, this very minute, there’s a small god up in heaven readying herself for us. Could it be? Could it possibly be? It sounds finger-licking good to me.”

—Arundhati Roy

Anthropogenic climate change is real. We can no longer afford to debate whether it really is happening. There is no time to lose. We have

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124 See SHEARER, supra note 4, at 208.

125 ROY, supra note 27, at 5 (1999).
to look squarely at the reality that the Arctic is melting, and that communities are being displaced and will continue to be displaced. We also have to admit to ourselves that the law must change to accommodate this emerging moment in history. This is no easy task. It seems daunting to take on “climate change.” But this is what I mean (and I think this is what Roy and Bankarjee mean) by the word ‘small.’ We have to break down large problems into smaller ones to render them visible. We have to start small and tell a story.

A. Climate Change Presents Difficulties for the “Thing Seen”

In the midst of the confusing confluence of rising public consciousness and manufactured corporate doubt regarding the hazards and realities associated with anthropogenic climate change, climate justice functions to clarify the immense and imminent scope of harm that will inevitably take place as the planet continues to warm. Kivalina brings into sharp focus the problems facing Arctic peoples especially, since the Arctic is warming at twice the rate as the rest of the world. Native Arctic peoples also occupy a particularly vulnerable position. Due to their traditional lifestyles, native Arctic peoples, such as the Kivalina residents, do not contribute to global warming as much as an urban dweller, for example, and yet they are currently the ones who face imminent displacement from their ancestral homes.

The age of climate change poses new challenges that are at once immense, urgent, and difficult to approach because they require a radical shift away from the status quo. The world is rapidly entering an era of irretrievable loss and irreparable change, and there is no better place to witness this than in the Arctic. By some calculations, the Arctic
will be completely ice-free in the summers by 2016. At a recent conference, spring of 2013, a panel moderator presented this fact and stunned me into silence. Three years. The panel moved on. A maritime attorney started talking about new shipping routes through the Arctic that would be available once the sea ice melted enough to allow for safe passage. It’s already happening, he said. Everyone wants a seat at the table. Some wide dissonance settled within me. Did anybody hear what the professor just said? The Arctic may be completely ice-free in the summers within three years. Why are we talking about new shipping routes?

I mechanically scribbled some numbers down. “London to Yokohama 15,700 kilometers through the Arctic. Or was it 13,841 kilometers? Through the Suez: 21,200 kilometers.” It made no difference to me. I know it means something for somebody out there. Sitting there in a chilly conference room in Salt Lake City, with the nerves at the back of my neck constricting, the numbers seemed irrelevant at first and sinister when I thought about it. This efficiency, this calculation, this anticipation—to even talk about “savings of fuel”—seemed absurd at that moment. Did you not hear that the Arctic is melting? You should not have the right to use the word ‘save’ in this context. To rescue or deliver from danger or harm. You do not get to talk about saving fuel right now. To preserve or guard from injury, destruction, or loss. How dare you use that word ‘save.’ It is too late to save the Arctic. It will be ice-free in the summer months within three years. Save. Some violent catachresis. The phrase ‘irreversible threshold crossing’ pulsated before my mind’s eye.

B. Climate Justice Can Help Reveal into Being Contradictory Narratives

It is part of the democratic task to reveal into being the plurality of experience, to bring forth the declaration e pluribus unum. The aspiration that out of many, there could be one, is of course an inherent paradox. If we recognize that there are many, why do we insist on just one? The acknowledgment of many but the insistence upon one reveals the simultaneous democratic celebration of and discomfort with

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132 Id.
plurality. Drawing from feminist legal theory and critical race theory, this essay too subscribes to the notion that “[a] unified identity, if such can ever exist, is a product of will, not a common destiny or natural birthright.” 133 This democratic experiment, this democratic consciousness is “. . . a process, a constant contradictory state of becoming, in which both social institutions and individual wills are deeply implicated.” 134

Within the growing narrative of climate justice, those harmed, like the Kivalina villagers, are directly experiencing the “contradictory state of becoming.” Life goes on, fractured and displaced, even as the Arctic melts. Climate change is perceived as incremental, not discrete, 135 and yet Arctic ice as we know it may cease to exist well within our lifetime. 136 Radical change to our ecosystems is experienced as slow violence. 137 But is the violence really slow? I guess it depends on who you talk to. For Kivalina, slow or fast, the violence has arrived, temporally and geographically. 138 Your home will be no longer. The problem is how to see it. How can we really see what is happening to our world, to our people, in the midst of such vast contradictions? Compound myopia with moneyed corporations exerting their well-funded influences to inject doubt into climate science. 139 Compound human folly with “hegemonic brevity or incessant promptness that . . . dominate[s] contemporary communications.” 140 The question becomes

133 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 584 (1990).
134 Id.
135 Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 507 (2007) (noting that “[t]he sources of climate change are obscure and multiple, and they lack faces; hence outrage, an amplifier with respect to public reactions to risk, is dampened or absent”).
136 See Vidal, supra note 130.
137 See generally NIXON, supra note 78.
138 Complaint at 46, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. C 08-1138 SBA) (citing ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: FLOODING, supra note 9, at 32, which concludes that Kivalina must be relocated in the near future since a perfect storm could completely flood the village).
139 A January 2007 report from the Union of Concerned Scientists offered a comprehensive overview of how ExxonMobil used misleading tactics to cloud the scientific understanding of climate change to delay action on the issue. The non-profit identified four tactics used by ExxonMobil: (1) the company “manufactured uncertainty,” (2) “information launder[ed] by using seemingly independent front organizations,” (3) “promoted scientific spokespeople who misrepresent peer-reviewed scientific findings,” and (4) “attempted to shift the focus away from meaningful action on global warming.” UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE, MIRRORS, & HOT AIR (2007), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/global_warming/exxon_report.pdf.
140 NIXON, supra note 78, at 275.
how can we see things clearly and “maintain our attention over the longue durée as we seek to extend and sustain the pathways to environmental justice . . .”? How can we continue to listen to one another, to empathize, to strive to understand one another, when our very world is “seething with virtual ecologies of connection and distraction”? When the structures of private power seek to obfuscate and sever routes of causation? How can we continue to understand integrity in a culture where everything is for sale? How can we cut through? Lose or win, no matter, the task is still the same: to cut through the contradictions and bring forth our specific truth. The environmental poverty lawyer and the advocate must continue to do so in the form of the utterance, through speech and critical writing, through narrative.

C. History and “the Geologic Now” Converge

Percolating among historians and scientists is the notion that the Anthropocene Age has arrived. “Now that humans—thanks to our numbers, the burning of fossil fuel, and other related activities—have become a geological agent on the planet, some scientists have proposed that we recognize the beginning of a new geological era, one in which humans act as a main determinant of the environment of the planet. The name they have coined for this new geological age is Anthropocene.” Historian Dipesh Chakrabarty, in his article, The Climate of History: Four Theses posits that if we are indeed in the Anthropocene Age,
“[t]he geologic now of the Anthropocene has become entangled with the now of human history.”

Similar to the contradictory narratives that form around the problem of climate change, the Anthropocene is the name of a moment in time where constructed and remembered human history converges with the “geologic now.” Humans press upon the world as a “geological agent,” and time and spatiality converge into present time. Chakrabarty goes on to articulate that “[t]he task of placing, historically, the crisis of climate change thus requires us to bring together intellectual formations that are somewhat in tension with each other: the planetary and the global; deep and recorded histories; species thinking and critiques of capital.” The opportunity to bring together intellectual formations that are at times disparate or not commonly in conversation with one another has arrived simultaneously with the moment of crisis. Critical poiesis.

Andrew Revkin writes in his series for the New York Times, Dot Earth, “As far as science can tell, there’s never, until now, been a point when a species became a planetary powerhouse and also became aware of that situation.” The interplay between coming into being as a planetary powerhouse and knowing that is the case is key, because not only do we now live in “a geological age of our own making,” we are aware of this circumstance. We are aware of ourselves as the “causative element.”

Again, climate justice and the Kivalina litigation in particular bring to light the contradictory narratives that intersect one another in this moment of great accelerated change. We know on a grand scale that man is the causative element for this new age, and yet we refuse to recognize that harm in Article III courts because an expert agency will somehow address that problem through environmental laws that could not have anticipated the realities of the Anthropocene. The multifaceted problems of climate change demand multifaceted responses, new forms of recognition, and an imaginative making within the law itself in order to make the future possible.

Revkin notes “that while the ‘great acceleration’ described by Steffen and others is already well under way, it’s entirely possible for humans

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147 Id. at 212.
148 Id. at 210.
149 Id. at 213.
150 Revkin, supra note 74.
151 Id.
152 Id.
to design their future, at least in a soft way, boosting odds that the geological record will have two phases—perhaps a ‘lesser’ and ‘greater’ Anthropocene.”¹⁵³ Like Arundhati Roy, I hope that this is a century of the small. It is my hope that environmental poverty lawyers in the twenty-first century can work locally but in solidarity to embrace the idiosyncrasies of the ‘lesser’ Anthropocene. This can only happen by embracing the contradictive revealing, which simultaneously requires expansion of our legalistic understanding of harm while lessening our mark on the earth. We must reconstitute our understanding of humanity in the Age of Man, the Anthropocene.

The term Anthropocene, similar to the phrase global warming, “is sufficiently vague to guarantee it will be interpreted in profoundly different ways by people with different world views. . . . Some will see this period as a ‘shame on us’ moment . . . . Some will argue for the importance of living smaller and leaving no scars. Others will revel in human dominion as a normal and natural part of our journey as a species.”¹⁵⁴ Revkin, as a science writer, believes in the importance of “making sure this conversation spills across all disciplinary and cultural boundaries from the get-go.”¹⁵⁵ Environmental justice in the twenty-first century is as good a vehicle as any to coordinate the conversation between disciplinary and cultural boundaries. The black letter law is useful to understand boundaries. But the role of the law is not simply to create boundaries—it can also create movement and solutions. The organizing principle of climate justice and the remaining task of the environmental justice advocate are to both acknowledge boundaries and to imagine overcoming them.

*Kivalina*, as much as it is a hallmark case of our time, is also utilizing the law as a vehicle to tell a story. It is very much the story of this shift in history where geological time and historical time finally converge to mark the ushering in of the Anthropocene age. *Kivalina* is a story about real people, irrevocable harm, and irretrievable loss. And so *Kivalina* is a story about death. *Kivalina* is also a metonym, a foreshadowing of what is to come. In this sense, *Kivalina* occupies the space of critical *poiesis*, straddling both the bounded narrative of the law and also the larger imaginative space of revealing.

¹⁵³ *Id.*
¹⁵⁴ *Id.*
¹⁵⁵ *Id.*
VII. EPILOGUE: “THE THING SEEN”

When poets are connected to the times in which they live, the forms they explore give us keys to the construction of meaning. Gertrude Stein made this point most succinctly: “Nothing changes from generation to generation except the thing seen and that makes a composition,” she wrote in “Composition as Explanation.” . . . Artists, she believed, are responsible for portraying this shifting emphasis; that is, for finding forms that reflect the movement of time, as neither historical narrative nor descriptive mimesis, but as immediate engagement and response.

—Ann Lauterbach

Can the lawyer also be a poet? Can the lawyer hold herself responsible for portraying a shifting emphasis in “the thing seen?” I argue in this essay that not only is this possible, it is deeply necessary in this age of great change, with the rise of the organizing principle of climate justice and the realities of large-scale displacement. There is little room to ask the law, at least in Court, for a change in the status quo. Politically, there is currently little possibility that Congress will take comprehensive action to address climate change. But we must not throw our hands up in defeat, because we do still have the lawyer, and the community organizer, and the voices of dissent. We are mostly lawyers here, so what can we do? The lawyer acts within the law, but as an advocate she has the ability to imagine new ways of being. The lawyer can be a poet. The environmental poverty lawyer must be a poet and an advocate. We must acknowledge where the fulcrum of the law currently sits, but we must insist that history still pivots and that the force of law resides in those who get to tell the story, and tell it compellingly.

In Greek, the word ‘history’ comes from ‘to ask.’ We must ask while we work, and by doing so create new histories. We must be obstinate in the face of climate change deniers, but we must still have hope. We must strip away the deliberate insouciance of corporate reports, infuse frigid data with stories, and continue to sharpen our critical eye in the age of information overload. But perhaps, the fundamental task is the ever-enduring responsibility environmental

156 LAUTERBACH, supra note 98, at 2.
157 “Here by ‘poet’ I mean the broadest sense of a creative maker of meaningful space. The possibility for such a poet is precisely the possibility for the creation of a new field of possibilities.” LEAR, supra note 13, at 51.
158 ANNE CARSON, NOX 1.1 (2010).
poverty lawyers have to make present, that tireless state of creative efficacy, to bring forth veritas. At the core of human history is the story of human fragility, and the only way something can be seen depends on the fitness and the power of representation.