An Unstable Cost-Benefit Analysis: How the Federal Courts Have Responded to Damage Claims Related to the Nuclear Power Industry
By Dara C. Pfeiffer
INTRODUCTION
In 1946, Congress announced its commitment to the development and expansion of nuclear power for military and commercial purposes by passing the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The Act placed the control and regulation of the military and commercial nuclear industries with the federal government. Pursuant to the Act, the federal government was granted ownership of all fissionable material and all the facilities producing that material. In addition, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created to supervise the growth of the nuclear power industry. The revised Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided private investors with government funding to stimulate the construction of commercial nuclear power plants and lessened the initial emphasis on the military uses of nuclear power. Most recently, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, reaffirming its commitment to the nuclear power industry by extending the federal indemnification and limitation of liability provisions for nuclear incidents and by adding a section which precludes courts from assessing punitive damages against the United States.
These legislative schemes illustrate Congress' unquestionable commitment to the expansion of the nuclear industry. In addition, they reflect a Congressional determination that nuclear power provides a cost-effective form of energy which lessens dependence on outside sources for energy needs and increases the United States' ability to compete. Despite these Congressional determinations, many challenges to the safety, efficiency and necessity of nuclear power have been heard by the federal courts. This note examines some of the recent case law associated with the development of commercial and military uses of nuclear power. This examination reveals an apparent inconsistency in the degree of deference that courts show to Congress' policy of encouraging development of the nuclear industry. Although the conflicting positions might be viewed as simply a reflection of judicial uncertainty in a complex regulatory setting, this note proposes that the conflicting positions reveal a judicial ambivalence towards the development of nuclear power, and an implicit questioning of the ability of Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to assure adequate public safety.
Part I of this note examines the challenge to the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act. Part II looks at the preemption issue and the inconsistent manner in which courts have or have not allowed state tort law to supplement federal nuclear safety regulations. Part III discusses the split among courts over whether special tort law rules should be developed to address the unique problems and risks posed by nuclear power. Finally, Part IV examines a series of cases in which courts have heard direct challenges to actions taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
In 1946, Congress announced its commitment to the development and expansion of nuclear power for military and commercial purposes by passing the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The Act placed the control and regulation of the military and commercial nuclear industries with the federal government. Pursuant to the Act, the federal government was granted ownership of all fissionable material and all the facilities producing that material. In addition, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was created to supervise the growth of the nuclear power industry. The revised Atomic Energy Act of 1954 provided private investors with government funding to stimulate the construction of commercial nuclear power plants and lessened the initial emphasis on the military uses of nuclear power. Most recently, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988, reaffirming its commitment to the nuclear power industry by extending the federal indemnification and limitation of liability provisions for nuclear incidents and by adding a section which precludes courts from assessing punitive damages against the United States.
These legislative schemes illustrate Congress' unquestionable commitment to the expansion of the nuclear industry. In addition, they reflect a Congressional determination that nuclear power provides a cost-effective form of energy which lessens dependence on outside sources for energy needs and increases the United States' ability to compete. Despite these Congressional determinations, many challenges to the safety, efficiency and necessity of nuclear power have been heard by the federal courts. This note examines some of the recent case law associated with the development of commercial and military uses of nuclear power. This examination reveals an apparent inconsistency in the degree of deference that courts show to Congress' policy of encouraging development of the nuclear industry. Although the conflicting positions might be viewed as simply a reflection of judicial uncertainty in a complex regulatory setting, this note proposes that the conflicting positions reveal a judicial ambivalence towards the development of nuclear power, and an implicit questioning of the ability of Congress and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to assure adequate public safety.
Part I of this note examines the challenge to the constitutionality of the Price-Anderson Act. Part II looks at the preemption issue and the inconsistent manner in which courts have or have not allowed state tort law to supplement federal nuclear safety regulations. Part III discusses the split among courts over whether special tort law rules should be developed to address the unique problems and risks posed by nuclear power. Finally, Part IV examines a series of cases in which courts have heard direct challenges to actions taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
