Nuclear Power Meets the 101st Congress, A "One-Act" Comedy: Regulation of Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensees Under the Clean Air Act
By Richard Goldsmith
INTRODUCTION
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Congress directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate all radioactive pollutants, including those emitted from facilities licensed and regulated under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Thus began the era of so-called “dual regulation.” Thirteen years later, that era ended with the passage of section 112(d)(9) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which authorized the EPA to refrain from regulating any category of NRC-licensed facility if it found that NRC regulation was adequate to protect public health.
This story of how Congress reversed regulatory policy is actually a story more about nuclear power than air pollution. Dual regulation was authorized in 1977 because of two concerns: fears about the public health risks associated with the nation's growing commitment to nuclear power and doubts about the integrity of nuclear regulation by the NRC. Although neither of these concerns had abated by 1990, the legislative process was so adroitly manipulated by the proponents of nuclear power that Congress, unwittingly, restored the NRC's regulatory monopoly.
Part II discusses the history of the dual regulation of radioactive pollutants by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which later became the NRC, and the EPA. Although the EPA initially expressed great reluctance to regulate radionuclide emissions, it eventually capitulated. This sudden change by the EPA together with the Agency's move to subject nuclear power plants to regulation spurred legislative proposals to end dual regulation. Next, part III discusses the enactment of section 112(d)(9) of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which authorizes the EPA not to regulate radionuclide emissions from NRC licensees if NRC regulation has provided an “ample margin of safety.” Not only did nuclear power become the focus of the debate over dual regulation, but Congress became so preoccupied by its concern for preserving the ambit of regulatory authority by the states that it never gave careful consideration to the actual costs and benefits of dual regulation by the federal government. Part IV then considers the likely impact of section 112(d)(9) on future federal regulation of nuclear power. The EPA has determined that NRC regulation of nuclear power reactors provides an “ample margin of safety”; this basis for the Agency's plan to rescind its emission standards for nuclear power reactors, however, may be flawed because the definition of “ample margin of safety” is fraught with ambiguities. Finally, part V considers the effect of section 112(d)(9) on future regulation of nuclear power by the states.
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Congress directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate all radioactive pollutants, including those emitted from facilities licensed and regulated under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Thus began the era of so-called “dual regulation.” Thirteen years later, that era ended with the passage of section 112(d)(9) of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which authorized the EPA to refrain from regulating any category of NRC-licensed facility if it found that NRC regulation was adequate to protect public health.
This story of how Congress reversed regulatory policy is actually a story more about nuclear power than air pollution. Dual regulation was authorized in 1977 because of two concerns: fears about the public health risks associated with the nation's growing commitment to nuclear power and doubts about the integrity of nuclear regulation by the NRC. Although neither of these concerns had abated by 1990, the legislative process was so adroitly manipulated by the proponents of nuclear power that Congress, unwittingly, restored the NRC's regulatory monopoly.
Part II discusses the history of the dual regulation of radioactive pollutants by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which later became the NRC, and the EPA. Although the EPA initially expressed great reluctance to regulate radionuclide emissions, it eventually capitulated. This sudden change by the EPA together with the Agency's move to subject nuclear power plants to regulation spurred legislative proposals to end dual regulation. Next, part III discusses the enactment of section 112(d)(9) of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, which authorizes the EPA not to regulate radionuclide emissions from NRC licensees if NRC regulation has provided an “ample margin of safety.” Not only did nuclear power become the focus of the debate over dual regulation, but Congress became so preoccupied by its concern for preserving the ambit of regulatory authority by the states that it never gave careful consideration to the actual costs and benefits of dual regulation by the federal government. Part IV then considers the likely impact of section 112(d)(9) on future federal regulation of nuclear power. The EPA has determined that NRC regulation of nuclear power reactors provides an “ample margin of safety”; this basis for the Agency's plan to rescind its emission standards for nuclear power reactors, however, may be flawed because the definition of “ample margin of safety” is fraught with ambiguities. Finally, part V considers the effect of section 112(d)(9) on future regulation of nuclear power by the states.
