Solving the "Tragedy": Transportation, Pollution and Regionalism in Atlanta
By Orlyn O. Lockard, III
INTRODUCTION
Advocates of political governance at a localized level in metropolitan areas of the United States typically base their support of local government on one of two general grounds: either public choice analysis or a political participation argument. According to public choice theory, decisions are best made at the local level because a system of multiple governmental units in close proximity to each other creates a ‘market’ for public goods and services as local governments compete for tax dollars in the form of potential residents and area residents choose to reside in the locality with the characteristics most closely approximating their own preferences. Theoretically, this market competition leads to a comparatively efficient provision of services in the aggregate. Under the political participation theory, localized governments are desirable because they foster a greater degree of political participation by local residents than centralized structures.
In contrast to these two theories, it has been argued that a high degree of local autonomy is actually detrimental to economic development in modern metropolitan areas because the effects of self-interested decisions made by local governments tend to be externalized upon other proximate localities such that the decisions do not optimize the welfare of the metropolitan area as a whole. In the case of such metropolitan areas, it is hypothesized that some degree of regional governance could avoid the “Tragedy of the Commons” problem frequently created by fragmented local control and alleviate the interlocal fiscal disparities that often result from policymaking at the local level.
Nevertheless, the metropolitan experience in this country has tended towards localism, because of an unwillingness on the part of local governments to cede power to comprehensive authorities in pursuit of the efficient provision of governmental services. But the creation of centralized authorities to coordinate the provision of individual governmental services at a regional level is not impossible, as the recent establishment of the Georgia Regional Transportation Agency (“GRTA”) demonstrates. The GRTA was created in response to the impacts of automobile-related pollution in metropolitan Atlanta.
This note examines recent developments in Atlanta within the context of local government theory and concludes that once the costs of localism become sufficiently high, disparate interests may unite and cause localities to cede power voluntarily to a centralized authority. From a broader perspective, recent developments in Atlanta may also suggest that two conditions must be fulfilled before a centralized coordination of efforts to alleviate the environmental harms of localism may be achieved: the costs of localism must be high and readily perceivable, and there must be a political leader willing and able to build a political consensus for the establishment of an authority with the coercive power to implement a regional solution.
Advocates of political governance at a localized level in metropolitan areas of the United States typically base their support of local government on one of two general grounds: either public choice analysis or a political participation argument. According to public choice theory, decisions are best made at the local level because a system of multiple governmental units in close proximity to each other creates a ‘market’ for public goods and services as local governments compete for tax dollars in the form of potential residents and area residents choose to reside in the locality with the characteristics most closely approximating their own preferences. Theoretically, this market competition leads to a comparatively efficient provision of services in the aggregate. Under the political participation theory, localized governments are desirable because they foster a greater degree of political participation by local residents than centralized structures.
In contrast to these two theories, it has been argued that a high degree of local autonomy is actually detrimental to economic development in modern metropolitan areas because the effects of self-interested decisions made by local governments tend to be externalized upon other proximate localities such that the decisions do not optimize the welfare of the metropolitan area as a whole. In the case of such metropolitan areas, it is hypothesized that some degree of regional governance could avoid the “Tragedy of the Commons” problem frequently created by fragmented local control and alleviate the interlocal fiscal disparities that often result from policymaking at the local level.
Nevertheless, the metropolitan experience in this country has tended towards localism, because of an unwillingness on the part of local governments to cede power to comprehensive authorities in pursuit of the efficient provision of governmental services. But the creation of centralized authorities to coordinate the provision of individual governmental services at a regional level is not impossible, as the recent establishment of the Georgia Regional Transportation Agency (“GRTA”) demonstrates. The GRTA was created in response to the impacts of automobile-related pollution in metropolitan Atlanta.
This note examines recent developments in Atlanta within the context of local government theory and concludes that once the costs of localism become sufficiently high, disparate interests may unite and cause localities to cede power voluntarily to a centralized authority. From a broader perspective, recent developments in Atlanta may also suggest that two conditions must be fulfilled before a centralized coordination of efforts to alleviate the environmental harms of localism may be achieved: the costs of localism must be high and readily perceivable, and there must be a political leader willing and able to build a political consensus for the establishment of an authority with the coercive power to implement a regional solution.
