The Sevin Made Me Do It: Mental Non-Responsibility and the Neurotoxic Damage Defense
By David B. Mcconnell
INTRODUCTION
Greg rested his head on the garage workbench as the dizziness crested. He spent most of his free time building model ships in his tiny garage to sell to local antique shops and art galleries, and the fumes of paint, glue, and varnish sometimes overcame him. He was to be the featured craftsperson at a show the next weekend and was working feverishly to complete his replica of the H.M.S. Serapis.
Greg had suffered from periodic spells of dizziness since he started building models twenty years ago. Recently, the spells had become more frequent and intense. His friends and family had also noticed uncharacteristic and increasing irritability over the past several weeks, but they attributed it to the tension of preparing for a major show.
His wife, Roseanna, brought lunch to him in the garage, but he shouted at her to leave him alone. He did the same a few hours later when she tried to bring him dinner. Now it was 2:00 a.m. . Once again, a tentative tap echoed throughout the garage. “Greg, I reheated some spaghetti in case you're hungry now.”
Roseanna gingerly opened the door with a nervous smile. Greg lifted his head from the bench and had a sudden flash of clarity. Roseanna had poisoned his food -- she was planning to kill him because she was jealous about his featured position in the show. She wanted to deny him the recognition that he so richly deserved! Consumed by rage, he grabbed a chisel from the bench and leapt for his wife. The plate of spaghetti crashed to the floor and a bare garage lightbulb swung wildly, casting liquid shadows on Roseanna's lifeless body.
Minutes later, Greg called 9-1-1. He was weeping over the body when the police and paramedics arrived. After Greg's arraignment, he and his attorney decided to argue that Greg was not responsible for the act because exposure to the model building materials had caused neurological damage which triggered his homicidal behavior.
The preceding scenario may seem farfetched, but exposure to certain chemicals can cause disordered reasoning and violent behavior. The average American is exposed to thousands of different natural and synthesized toxic substances over his lifetime. The vast majority of those chemicals have not been tested, either alone or in combination, for their effects on human neurological systems. Researchers, however, have established some linkage between neurological damage and exposure to particular substances even within the small subset of tested chemicals. The resulting neuropathy can lead to behavioral or cognitive aberration. In a few criminal cases, defendants have argued that the behavioral/cognitive sequelae from neurotoxic exposure should excuse the offense.
This strategy has had only limited success, but neurotoxic exposure may provide the basis for a legitimate defense. If a defendant can draw a causative physiological connection between exposure to a toxin, consequential neurological damage, and a correlative behavioral/cognitive deficit which is relevant to the offense, a valid claim of non-responsibility should lie. Such defendants should be permitted to present etiological evidence so that fact-finders will have a more informed basis for determining culpability.
The philosophical and legal framework of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence provides a niche of non-responsibility for behavior which is the product of endogenous or exogenous mental disease. Since punishment is predicated on the free will of the actor, we do not punish those who have not freely chosen to commit bad acts and may be undeterred by the prospect of punishment. Even if a neurologically damaged defendant is ultimately held responsible for his actions, the impairment should be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing. The validity of neuropsychological testing and potential problems with post-disposition treatment are particularly troublesome issues, but these difficulties should not preclude a neurotoxic damage defense. A combination of prosecutorial discretion and judicial sensitivity should mark the administration of this claim.
Part II of this Note establishes the physiological basis for the neurotoxic damage defense and discusses the philosophical reasons for acquitting those who lack free agency. The Part ends with an examination of existing defenses which could be adapted to fit a neurotoxic fact pattern. Part III reviews the scant existing case law on point and posits some reasons as to the success or failure of the neurotoxic damage defense in each case. Part IV addresses relevant evidentiary issues. This Part also discusses neurotoxic damage as a consideration in post-verdict disposition or as a mitigating factor during sentencing. Part V outlines each step of Greg's hypothetical defense, and Part VI concludes with normative suggestions about the administration of the neurotoxic damage defense.
Greg rested his head on the garage workbench as the dizziness crested. He spent most of his free time building model ships in his tiny garage to sell to local antique shops and art galleries, and the fumes of paint, glue, and varnish sometimes overcame him. He was to be the featured craftsperson at a show the next weekend and was working feverishly to complete his replica of the H.M.S. Serapis.
Greg had suffered from periodic spells of dizziness since he started building models twenty years ago. Recently, the spells had become more frequent and intense. His friends and family had also noticed uncharacteristic and increasing irritability over the past several weeks, but they attributed it to the tension of preparing for a major show.
His wife, Roseanna, brought lunch to him in the garage, but he shouted at her to leave him alone. He did the same a few hours later when she tried to bring him dinner. Now it was 2:00 a.m. . Once again, a tentative tap echoed throughout the garage. “Greg, I reheated some spaghetti in case you're hungry now.”
Roseanna gingerly opened the door with a nervous smile. Greg lifted his head from the bench and had a sudden flash of clarity. Roseanna had poisoned his food -- she was planning to kill him because she was jealous about his featured position in the show. She wanted to deny him the recognition that he so richly deserved! Consumed by rage, he grabbed a chisel from the bench and leapt for his wife. The plate of spaghetti crashed to the floor and a bare garage lightbulb swung wildly, casting liquid shadows on Roseanna's lifeless body.
Minutes later, Greg called 9-1-1. He was weeping over the body when the police and paramedics arrived. After Greg's arraignment, he and his attorney decided to argue that Greg was not responsible for the act because exposure to the model building materials had caused neurological damage which triggered his homicidal behavior.
The preceding scenario may seem farfetched, but exposure to certain chemicals can cause disordered reasoning and violent behavior. The average American is exposed to thousands of different natural and synthesized toxic substances over his lifetime. The vast majority of those chemicals have not been tested, either alone or in combination, for their effects on human neurological systems. Researchers, however, have established some linkage between neurological damage and exposure to particular substances even within the small subset of tested chemicals. The resulting neuropathy can lead to behavioral or cognitive aberration. In a few criminal cases, defendants have argued that the behavioral/cognitive sequelae from neurotoxic exposure should excuse the offense.
This strategy has had only limited success, but neurotoxic exposure may provide the basis for a legitimate defense. If a defendant can draw a causative physiological connection between exposure to a toxin, consequential neurological damage, and a correlative behavioral/cognitive deficit which is relevant to the offense, a valid claim of non-responsibility should lie. Such defendants should be permitted to present etiological evidence so that fact-finders will have a more informed basis for determining culpability.
The philosophical and legal framework of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence provides a niche of non-responsibility for behavior which is the product of endogenous or exogenous mental disease. Since punishment is predicated on the free will of the actor, we do not punish those who have not freely chosen to commit bad acts and may be undeterred by the prospect of punishment. Even if a neurologically damaged defendant is ultimately held responsible for his actions, the impairment should be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing. The validity of neuropsychological testing and potential problems with post-disposition treatment are particularly troublesome issues, but these difficulties should not preclude a neurotoxic damage defense. A combination of prosecutorial discretion and judicial sensitivity should mark the administration of this claim.
Part II of this Note establishes the physiological basis for the neurotoxic damage defense and discusses the philosophical reasons for acquitting those who lack free agency. The Part ends with an examination of existing defenses which could be adapted to fit a neurotoxic fact pattern. Part III reviews the scant existing case law on point and posits some reasons as to the success or failure of the neurotoxic damage defense in each case. Part IV addresses relevant evidentiary issues. This Part also discusses neurotoxic damage as a consideration in post-verdict disposition or as a mitigating factor during sentencing. Part V outlines each step of Greg's hypothetical defense, and Part VI concludes with normative suggestions about the administration of the neurotoxic damage defense.
