U.S. Sub-Federal Climate Change Initiatives: An Irrational Means to a Rational End?
By Kevin L. Doran
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a dizzying profusion of greenhouse gas (GHG)-reducing policy initiatives have been introduced and implemented by sub-federal entities in the United States. Across much of the country, advisory groups, task forces, action teams, councils, and commissions on climate change are springing to life. Businesses, cities, and states are proclaiming commitments to achieving reductions in GHG emissions. Regional climate change initiatives--involving all levels of government (notwithstanding the federal level) and civil society--are populating the political landscape at an increasing pace. In short, if one were to peer beneath the federal lid to see what sub-federal actors are doing with respect to climate change, there would be no shortage of things to watch.
There is, of course, a comparative context that provides the bustle to the bustling picture of activity painted above. That context is the ostensible lack of any meaningful action by the federal government with respect to climate change. There are many pronouncements on this score. And whether accurate or not, such pronouncements have done much to cast the rhetorical die. To wit: states are acting, while the federal government is not.
As some commentators note, however, there is an apparent illogic in the flurry of sub-federal activity directed at climate change. When viewed through the lens of traditional commons analysis, it would seem that rational sub-federal actors should eschew unilateral (or even regional) actions to reduce their GHG emissions, given that the atmosphere is a true global commons wherein GHG emissions from one part of the world are entirely fungible with emissions from any other part of the world. Viewed in this light, to the extent that sub-federal GHG reductions actually result in climatic benefits, any such benefits would be lost through such market inefficiencies as free-riding, hold-outs, leakage, and even insouciance. Moreover, regardless of these inefficiencies, the impact of GHG reductions by sub-federal actors on global temperature will necessarily be statistically inconsequential--for all their efforts, the benefits such actors will accrue in terms of avoided global warming will, in practical terms, be nonexistent.
So why, then, are states and other sub-federal actors laboring so intently to deter a phenomenon that is clearly beyond their ability to meaningfully affect? And why are they doing so when the global nature of climate change requires that any meaningful mitigation efforts come from a truly global response? Does this bevy of sub-federal activity make sense? And if so, how does it make sense (meaning, pursuant to what justificatory perspective)?
This Article takes up the question of whether sub-federal mitigation efforts can be seen as rational with respect to the objective of achieving meaningful mitigation of climate change. There are, of course, a great many reasons as to why sub-federal actors are engaging in mitigation efforts--many of which have nothing at all to do with climate change. The intent here, however, is not to explore the rationality of sub-federal mitigation efforts with respect to the many reasons and rationales that underlie such efforts. Instead, assuming arguendo that a primary or ultimate objective of sub-federal climate mitigation policies is to achieve meaningful mitigation of global climate change, this Article aims to explore the extent to which these efforts can be seen as rational with respect to that objective.
The analytical theme developed in this Article regards not only the extent to which sub-federal GHG mitigation initiatives can be seen as rational actions with respect to the goal of achieving meaningful mitigation of global climate change, but also the manner in which the justifications and rationales offered in support of these initiatives contribute to this ostensible rationality. This latter dynamic is intriguing inasmuch as it points to a relationship wherein an action that would otherwise be irrational (viewed in the context of meaningful climate mitigation) achieves rationality in part through the rhetorical force of an irrational argument.
Part I of this Article sets the contextual and comparative stage with a discussion of key U.S. and global issues and trends relating to climate change and energy.
Part II of this Article introduces a conceptual formulation made by the linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin regarding constative and performative statements. This distinction between constative and performative statements is offered--in a rather modified fashion--as a form of analytical metastructure to organize and understand the types of justifications and rationales offered on behalf of explicit sub-federal climate mitigation efforts. This schema, in turn, is a helpful analytical devise for exploring the rationality of sub-federal mitigation efforts with respect to the goal of achieving meaningful climate mitigation--an issue taken up in Part IV.
Given the large and growing number of sub-federal GHG-related initiatives, offering a comprehensive account of these initiatives is well beyond the scope or ambition of this paper. To help situate the discussion of rationality vis-à-vis sub-federal mitigation efforts and limit the analytical scope to a manageable size, the discussion in Part III is confined to analyzing the proliferation and substance of state GHG reduction targets.
Of course, to explore the rationality of sub-federal climate mitigation efforts, one must come to some conclusions--however tentative and general-- regarding the actual and potential impacts of these efforts. Part III of this Article takes up this task by offering a heuristic, quantitative assessment of the magnitude of GHG reductions that can be achieved through current sub-federal initiatives.
In Part IV of this Article explores the question of why sub-federal entities are engaging in explicit climate mitigation efforts by focusing, as an initial matter, on the types of purpose-related justifications offered on behalf of--or with respect to--such efforts. What claims and rationales are offered in support of these efforts? To what extent, and in what manner, are these justifications explicitly directed at climate change, energy security, and economic competitiveness? There are two primary reasons for this initial exercise: First, while justifications offered with respect to a given policy do not necessarily reflect the actual intent (or set of intentions) underlying the policy's creation, they nonetheless offer insight into the manner in which the purpose of that policy was marketed. For instance, a justification along the lines of “we enact X policy in order to achieve Z result” may not reveal the real reasons that “we” enacted X, but it does shed some light on what “we” considered a cogent justification (i.e., Z) for doing so. Second, by assaying the various justifications offered on behalf of sub-federal climate mitigation efforts, one can develop a kind of justificatory baseline that represents the universe of explicit expectations and results associated with these efforts. The extent to which this justificatory baseline matches up with the actual and potential impacts of sub-federal climate mitigation efforts can then be assessed.
Part IV also endeavors to weave the various themes developed and explored in the previous parts into a cohesive and conceptually unified whole. The goal in this part is to “show” how sub-federal mitigation efforts are in fact rational from a perspective that seeks to achieve meaningful climate mitigation. The role that explicit rationales and justifications play with respect to climate change initiatives is an important element of this discussion.
Sub-federal actors appear to be doing a great deal to stop a problem that cannot, by their own efforts, be stopped or even measurably slowed. Their efforts to mitigate climate change seem akin to placing a brightly colored paper hat on the head of a child sitting on the railroad tracks in the hopes that the hat will, somehow, stop the incoming locomotive from harming the child. Would it not be better to try and move the child off the tracks? This Article concludes that the most rational course of action is to refrain from any efforts to move the hat and its precious wearer off the tracks. And moreover, that a paper hat is actually the best protection available.
In recent years, a dizzying profusion of greenhouse gas (GHG)-reducing policy initiatives have been introduced and implemented by sub-federal entities in the United States. Across much of the country, advisory groups, task forces, action teams, councils, and commissions on climate change are springing to life. Businesses, cities, and states are proclaiming commitments to achieving reductions in GHG emissions. Regional climate change initiatives--involving all levels of government (notwithstanding the federal level) and civil society--are populating the political landscape at an increasing pace. In short, if one were to peer beneath the federal lid to see what sub-federal actors are doing with respect to climate change, there would be no shortage of things to watch.
There is, of course, a comparative context that provides the bustle to the bustling picture of activity painted above. That context is the ostensible lack of any meaningful action by the federal government with respect to climate change. There are many pronouncements on this score. And whether accurate or not, such pronouncements have done much to cast the rhetorical die. To wit: states are acting, while the federal government is not.
As some commentators note, however, there is an apparent illogic in the flurry of sub-federal activity directed at climate change. When viewed through the lens of traditional commons analysis, it would seem that rational sub-federal actors should eschew unilateral (or even regional) actions to reduce their GHG emissions, given that the atmosphere is a true global commons wherein GHG emissions from one part of the world are entirely fungible with emissions from any other part of the world. Viewed in this light, to the extent that sub-federal GHG reductions actually result in climatic benefits, any such benefits would be lost through such market inefficiencies as free-riding, hold-outs, leakage, and even insouciance. Moreover, regardless of these inefficiencies, the impact of GHG reductions by sub-federal actors on global temperature will necessarily be statistically inconsequential--for all their efforts, the benefits such actors will accrue in terms of avoided global warming will, in practical terms, be nonexistent.
So why, then, are states and other sub-federal actors laboring so intently to deter a phenomenon that is clearly beyond their ability to meaningfully affect? And why are they doing so when the global nature of climate change requires that any meaningful mitigation efforts come from a truly global response? Does this bevy of sub-federal activity make sense? And if so, how does it make sense (meaning, pursuant to what justificatory perspective)?
This Article takes up the question of whether sub-federal mitigation efforts can be seen as rational with respect to the objective of achieving meaningful mitigation of climate change. There are, of course, a great many reasons as to why sub-federal actors are engaging in mitigation efforts--many of which have nothing at all to do with climate change. The intent here, however, is not to explore the rationality of sub-federal mitigation efforts with respect to the many reasons and rationales that underlie such efforts. Instead, assuming arguendo that a primary or ultimate objective of sub-federal climate mitigation policies is to achieve meaningful mitigation of global climate change, this Article aims to explore the extent to which these efforts can be seen as rational with respect to that objective.
The analytical theme developed in this Article regards not only the extent to which sub-federal GHG mitigation initiatives can be seen as rational actions with respect to the goal of achieving meaningful mitigation of global climate change, but also the manner in which the justifications and rationales offered in support of these initiatives contribute to this ostensible rationality. This latter dynamic is intriguing inasmuch as it points to a relationship wherein an action that would otherwise be irrational (viewed in the context of meaningful climate mitigation) achieves rationality in part through the rhetorical force of an irrational argument.
Part I of this Article sets the contextual and comparative stage with a discussion of key U.S. and global issues and trends relating to climate change and energy.
Part II of this Article introduces a conceptual formulation made by the linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin regarding constative and performative statements. This distinction between constative and performative statements is offered--in a rather modified fashion--as a form of analytical metastructure to organize and understand the types of justifications and rationales offered on behalf of explicit sub-federal climate mitigation efforts. This schema, in turn, is a helpful analytical devise for exploring the rationality of sub-federal mitigation efforts with respect to the goal of achieving meaningful climate mitigation--an issue taken up in Part IV.
Given the large and growing number of sub-federal GHG-related initiatives, offering a comprehensive account of these initiatives is well beyond the scope or ambition of this paper. To help situate the discussion of rationality vis-à-vis sub-federal mitigation efforts and limit the analytical scope to a manageable size, the discussion in Part III is confined to analyzing the proliferation and substance of state GHG reduction targets.
Of course, to explore the rationality of sub-federal climate mitigation efforts, one must come to some conclusions--however tentative and general-- regarding the actual and potential impacts of these efforts. Part III of this Article takes up this task by offering a heuristic, quantitative assessment of the magnitude of GHG reductions that can be achieved through current sub-federal initiatives.
In Part IV of this Article explores the question of why sub-federal entities are engaging in explicit climate mitigation efforts by focusing, as an initial matter, on the types of purpose-related justifications offered on behalf of--or with respect to--such efforts. What claims and rationales are offered in support of these efforts? To what extent, and in what manner, are these justifications explicitly directed at climate change, energy security, and economic competitiveness? There are two primary reasons for this initial exercise: First, while justifications offered with respect to a given policy do not necessarily reflect the actual intent (or set of intentions) underlying the policy's creation, they nonetheless offer insight into the manner in which the purpose of that policy was marketed. For instance, a justification along the lines of “we enact X policy in order to achieve Z result” may not reveal the real reasons that “we” enacted X, but it does shed some light on what “we” considered a cogent justification (i.e., Z) for doing so. Second, by assaying the various justifications offered on behalf of sub-federal climate mitigation efforts, one can develop a kind of justificatory baseline that represents the universe of explicit expectations and results associated with these efforts. The extent to which this justificatory baseline matches up with the actual and potential impacts of sub-federal climate mitigation efforts can then be assessed.
Part IV also endeavors to weave the various themes developed and explored in the previous parts into a cohesive and conceptually unified whole. The goal in this part is to “show” how sub-federal mitigation efforts are in fact rational from a perspective that seeks to achieve meaningful climate mitigation. The role that explicit rationales and justifications play with respect to climate change initiatives is an important element of this discussion.
Sub-federal actors appear to be doing a great deal to stop a problem that cannot, by their own efforts, be stopped or even measurably slowed. Their efforts to mitigate climate change seem akin to placing a brightly colored paper hat on the head of a child sitting on the railroad tracks in the hopes that the hat will, somehow, stop the incoming locomotive from harming the child. Would it not be better to try and move the child off the tracks? This Article concludes that the most rational course of action is to refrain from any efforts to move the hat and its precious wearer off the tracks. And moreover, that a paper hat is actually the best protection available.
